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Transformational Fallibilism and the Development of Understanding 
 
Abstract: This article argues that inquirers should adopt an active orientation to the limits of 
their knowledge, an approach referred to as ‘Transformational Fallibilism’.  Drawing on the 
Popperian tradition, this approach treats the fallibility of knowledge as more than a 
philosophical nicety, rather seeing the questioning of claims, including those that have been 
successful, as a key way to improve the understandings of inquirers.  This is illustrated with 
reference to the example of Newtonian and Einsteinian understandings of gravity and time 
in the natural sciences, and debates about the role of fathers in child-rearing in the social 
sciences.  I compare this approach to that found within critical realism, arguing that while 
defenders of the latter acknowledge fallibility to some extent, certain of their arguments 
also place problematic limits on it.  Examining Sayer’s work, I argue that his view that 
practically successful understandings reveal something about the structure of the world 
involves an over-confidence in these understandings.  I suggest that Elder-Vass’s use of the 
idea of approximate truth involves a similar difficulty.  By contrast, I argue for the 
importance of treating all elements of the understanding, including those bound up with 
practical successes, as potentially in need of reconstruction at any point. 
 
Keywords: Fallibilism, Critical Realism, Philosophy of Science, Andrew Sayer, Dave Elder-
Vass 
 
1.  Introduction 
I was talking to a fellow attendee at a conference a year or so ago, and the subject of the 
fallibility of knowledge came up.  My colleague was clearly irritated by the concept.  ‘The 
fallibility of knowledge!’, he said, ‘What’s so interesting about that?  Everyone 
acknowledges that knowledge is fallible don’t they?!’1  This seemed to me to be insightful, 
up to a point.  At least within the sphere of contemporary sociology and social theory there 
are few if any thinkers who defend the idea that knowledge is infallible.  Constructionists, 
post-structuralists, feminist epistemologists, complexity theorists, and actor-network 
theorists, to name adherents to a few of the significant positions within the landscape of 
social theory, are all comfortable with, and often insistent upon, the idea that knowledge is 
fallible.  Even those who retain some enthusiasm for science and its achievements, such as 
critical realists and neo-pragmatists, nevertheless explicitly espouse the view that 
knowledge is fallible.  Proponents of all of these positions accept that the truth of a 
knowledge claim cannot be established with certainty, even if they differ on how sceptical 
and critical one should be about the knowledge claims of scientists and others.  As such, this 
conference conversation pushed me to think harder about whether there is nevertheless 
something important about the idea of fallibility that is not generally accepted; whether 
there is something to be learned from thinking carefully about fallibility.  My conclusion was 
that there is a further lesson to be learned, and this article attempts to articulate it. 
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The approach to knowledge expounded and defended in this article is what I call 
‘transformational fallibilism’.  Whereas some of those who accept fallibilism draw very few 
consequences from the argument that our knowledge claims are uncertain, 
transformational fallibilism suggests that there are important lessons for inquiry that should 
be drawn from this argument.  I will be arguing that transformational fallibilism is a valuable 
approach and elaborating on this by means of a comparison with the approach to fallibilism 
taken within critical realism, a position which provides a valuable contrast for three reasons.  
Firstly, it is a key, prominent, contemporary approach to the philosophy of social science.  
Secondly, critical realism’s proponents are explicitly committed to fallibilism and this allows 
me to explore the difference between what I see as their somewhat limited commitment in 
this area and the transformational approach being defended here.  Thirdly, engaging with 
critical realism allows me to explore two specific ways in which a commitment to fallibility 
can be limited, each resulting in what I would see as an over-confidence in (some) beliefs.  
One is by the argument that practically successful beliefs reveal something about the nature 
of the subject-matter that knowers are engaging with.  The other is by the contention that it 
is possible for inquirers to identify which beliefs are approximately true.  I will be arguing 
that both of these moves, each of which is defended by an important critical realist thinker, 
mistakenly reify current beliefs and understandings which are better treated as open to 
critical appraisal and reconstruction in the service of improving our understandings. 
The arguments presented herein resonate with a previous critique of critical realism 
developed by Justin Cruickshank.  Cruickshank (2004) usefully argues that the critical realist 
approach to ontology is somewhat inconsistent in its attitude to the fallibility of ontological 
argument itself.  At times, critical realists treat their ontology as part of a process of inquiry 
and as something that could itself be transformed; at other times it is treated as if it is 
beyond the realm of transitive change.  In this article I want to develop this view about the 
inconsistency within critical realist arguments but do so not by focusing on the status of 
ontological argument but on the critical realist view of substantive knowledge claims.  The 
intention of this engagement is to show the limitations of the critical realist approach and 
demonstrate what a committed embrace of fallibilism would involve. 
The article will proceed as follows.  Firstly I will develop an account of transformational 
fallibility with reference to other arguments in the philosophy of science and examples from 
the natural and social sciences.  Then I will go on to introduce critical realism with reference 
to the work of Roy Bhaskar, before exploring its approach to fallibilism in detail by 
examining one classic work, Method in Social Science by Andrew Sayer (1992 [1984]), and 
one recent book by a prominent realist, The Reality of Social Construction, by Dave Elder-
Vass (2012).  Once I have critically appraised these approaches I will conclude the article by 
addressing the question of transformational fallibilism’s ‘realism’ or otherwise. 2 
 
2. Transformational Fallibilism and Improving Networks of Understanding 
The argument I want to defend and explore in this section is the claim that inquirers should 
treat all elements of their understanding, including theoretical and factual claims, as 
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potentially requiring revision in order to take their inquiry forward.   Such an approach is 
fallibilist, but goes beyond a limited adherence to this doctrine insofar as it does not treat 
the idea that a claim may be untrue as simply a philosophical nicety that an inquirer can 
acknowledge whilst retaining great confidence in the truth of certain beliefs for the time 
being.  Rather, it argues that in order to develop knowledge, even apparently obvious and 
hard-to-question beliefs should have their limitations explored.  The approach advocated 
here thus has affinities with Popperian approaches in which fallibility is seen as a 
fundamental feature of knowledge (see e.g. Popper, 1959).  This approach, that I have 
termed ‘transformational fallibilism’, argues that in pursuing an inquiry the investigator 
should be willing to subject any element to questioning and ultimately revision or 
reconstruction in order to improve their network of understandings.  This statement 
immediately raises a whole set of issues about the meaning of its key terms, and explaining 
these will be part of how I develop and justify my account. 
Starting with the notion of inquiry, I am using this in a broad sense to indicate an 
investigation in which a knower/knowers are trying to better understand some subject 
matter.  This can include, but is not restricted to, attempts to describe it, characterise its 
properties, explain features of it, relate it to other phenomena, comprehend it, and so on.  
Next I want to comment on why I use the term ‘understandings’ and what it means to refer 
to them as a ‘network’.  I am referring to ‘understandings’ to indicate a pluralistic 
orientation to the range of aspects that could be said to be part of inquirers’ attempts to 
know.  This can include beliefs, concepts, theories, factual claims, models, exemplary 
problem solutions, and so on.  In this article I will often be discussing theories and factual 
claims, but my suggestion is that the same arguments apply to all of the elements of the 
understanding mentioned above.  In relation to the term ‘network’, I use this in order to 
emphasize the interconnected character of the elements of the understanding.  As I argue 
further below, such elements are not “atoms” with independent identities that happen to 
be collected together, but are crucially connected with one another in ways which impact 
upon their meaning and import.  In conceptualizing understanding this way I am drawing on 
the insights of post-positivist philosophers of science such as Quine (1951) and Kuhn (1970 
[1962]) who, in different ways, emphasized the importance of the interconnection of 
understandings. 
The last of these definitional points brings me to the deeper question of what it means for 
an inquirer to improve their understandings.  I admit there are many possible ways of 
analysing such a notion, and also that the very idea of inquirers improving understanding in 
the first place might be questioned by those of a skeptical bent (cf. Woolgar, 1988).  What I 
am hoping to do here is put forward an idea of improvement that would have at least some 
elements that would be accepted by many of those who are not committed to skepticism.  
This proposal is not intended as a complete account of what it means for an inquirer to 
improve their understanding, but as one part of a wider picture.  As such, it would be more 
precise to refer to it as ‘problem-solving improvement’.  Problem-solving improvement, as I 
am accounting for it here, occurs when an inquirer reasons through anomalies and 
contradictions within their existing network in a way that increases the coherence of their 
understandings.  The basic idea is that if an inquirer can reasonably address contradictions 
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and anomalies in their network of understanding in a way that increases the coherence of 
that network, this can legitimately be seen as an improvement.   
The element of this definition that would straightforwardly find sympathy with defenders of 
a range of approaches is the focus on increasing coherence and the removal of anomalies 
(inconsistent elements of the understanding).3  Most obviously this is the case with the 
approach of Popper and his followers, who argue that theoretical systems are problematic 
where they have anomalies, and argue for the systematic address of these (Popper, 1959; 
Lakatos, 1978).  However, the value of coherence is recognized in other approaches.  For 
example, defenders of a critical realist approach object to contradictory theories on the 
basis that the world itself cannot both ‘be’ and ‘not be’ in some particular state (cf. Elder-
Vass, 2012).  Many defenders of a pragmatist view of knowledge would also see 
contradictory theories as problematic, on the basis that they are disabling in terms of the 
guidance they supply for our practical actions (cf. Garrison, 1994).   
Nevertheless, it is an important part of my argument that increasing the coherence of a 
network of understanding is not sufficient to generate problem-solving improvement.  As 
writers like Barnes (1982) have noted, it is possible to increase the proportion of one’s 
beliefs that are coherent by the simple expedient of abandoning anomalous beliefs.  Given 
that I have suggested that inquiry involves activities such as describing, characterising 
and/or explaining the features of some subject matter, it would be an odd account of 
improvement in this area which would see these as straightforwardly achievable by 
abandoning beliefs about that subject matter.4  This is why I have required that in working 
towards coherence inquirers must be attempting to ‘reason through’ problems with existing 
belief.  To simply abandon beliefs is not to engage with why those beliefs were held in the 
first place and what the ramifications of abandoning them will be.  Just dropping beliefs also 
doesn’t engage with why the contradiction arose in the first place.  Putting the argument 
more positively, problem-solving improvement results from an attempt to puzzle out why 
anomalies/contradictions exist in one’s understanding and what their significance is, given 
the subject matter they pertain to.  On this view, anomalies are identifying something that 
the inquirer needs to attend to.  What is needed is to puzzle through why the anomalies 
have arisen and how reconstructing existing understandings to resolve them can allow the 
inquirer to better understand their subject matter.  Let me try to illustrate this idea with two 
examples, one from everyday life and one from the history of scientific investigation. 
Imagine that I leave a biscuit out on the bench one night and discover in the morning that it 
has gone.  I ask my daughter about this and she says that she did not eat it. I cannot think of 
another explanation for why the biscuit has disappeared and so decide that she must be 
lying about it.  However, my network of understandings includes a belief that my daughter is 
an honest person and does not tell lies about everyday situations.  In such a case I have an 
anomaly to face, in that my explanation of the disappearance of the biscuit entails that my 
daughter is lying, yet I believe her to be honest.  Now, if increasing the coherence of belief 
was all that was required to produce a problem-solving improvement, I could achieve this 
simply by dropping the belief that my daughter ate the biscuit.  However, to my mind this 
would be unsatisfactory, and would not constitute an improvement, because it would not 
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address the reason the anomaly came up in the first place: that I was engaged in an inquiry 
oriented to explaining the disappearance of the biscuit.  To actually improve my 
understanding, a more positive response is required, one that explores further the basis of 
the anomaly.  In this case, different avenues could be explored to try and achieve this, 
including: (1) re-assessing whether I am right to believe that my daughter is honest through 
e.g. a reconsideration of previous events; and (2) looking for another explanation of the 
disappearance of the biscuit.  Taking the latter tack, I may inspect further and find little 
droppings on the bench, and take these as evidence that mice have been at work.  In such a 
situation I can attribute the disappearance of the biscuit to the mice and replace my initial 
attribution of responsibility with a plausible alternative.  This removes the incompatibility 
between my belief in my daughter’s honesty, my daughter’s statement on the matter, and 
my account of the disappearance of the biscuit.  Furthermore, it does so in a way which uses 
the stimulus of the anomaly as a motivation to reason through the situation, increase the 
coherence of my understandings and thus improve them. 
Let’s take another example now, this time from the history of science.  Hanson (1962) notes 
that it was observed in the 19th century that the orbit of Uranus had odd perturbations that 
were anomalous with other aspects of the network of understandings shared by many 19th 
century scientists.  This network included Newtonian gravitational theories, theories of 
mechanics, and understandings of the position and gravitational influence of the known 
planets.  The difficulty was that observations of Uranus’s position did not cohere with other 
aspects of the understanding.  In order to resolve this problem, Leverrier (and others) 
postulated that there must be a planet beyond Uranus, the gravitational influence of which 
explained the oddities of Uranus’s orbit.  Observations were made and it was established 
that there was a further planet beyond Uranus, which was named Neptune.  This improved 
the coherence of existing knowledge, as the orbit of Uranus was now compatible again with 
the extant gravitational and mechanical theories, and also incorporated Neptune into the 
network.  Furthermore, it did so by reasoning through the sources of the anomaly rather 
than, for example, discarding the observations of the orbit of Uranus without giving any 
reason for doing so.  This also exemplifies the more general point that to move towards a 
problem-solving improvement one needs to be concerned not merely that an anomaly 
exists but with why it exists, and resolving this issue is part of moving towards coherence. 
Having discussed the idea that reasoning through anomalies in order to increase the 
coherence of a network of understandings is one way for inquirers to improve their 
knowledge, this now needs to be linked to the question of transformation.  The connection 
is the important idea that in order to improve networks of understanding by positively 
addressing anomalies, we may need to transform even currently successful understandings.5  
It is true that some revisions may involve altering beliefs that were only tentatively held 
anyway, and thus are relatively untroublesome to alter.  However there are also cases 
where an anomaly can only be dealt with by reconstructing or rejecting theoretical ideas 
that have been successful.   
What counts as ‘success’ in this sense is a difficult question which has been extensively 
discussed by philosophers (for just two of many possible examples see Van Fraassen, 1980; 
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Rorty, 1991).  I am not intending to contribute to these debates so much as give a relatively 
permissive account which captures a key element for the purposes of this argument.  This is 
that success refers to the belief of inquirers that some theory (or other element of the 
understanding) is supported by claims that they consider to be in some way a test of that 
theory – by being relatively ‘empirical’, ‘practical’, or ‘observational’.  To return to an earlier 
example, those investigating astronomical phenomena considered the observations of 
Uranus to be a success for Newtonian theories, one such success among many.  It is this 
kind of success which often encourages inquirers to hold very strongly to theories that are 
backed up in this way.  Nevertheless, it is central to the account developed here that even 
successful theories may need to be reconstructed or rejected. 
This account of the fallibility of successful theories is most consistently expounded in the 
Popperian tradition, with Popper (1959), and those inspired by him such as Lakatos (1978) 
and Larry Laudan (1981), defending the notion that no scientific theory is immune from 
rejection or transformation as inquiry progresses.  Laudan, in particular, is known for 
exploring the defeasibility of successful theories, with his classic article ‘A Confutation of 
Convergent Realism’ (1981) identifying a range of theories that were empirically successful 
but ultimately rejected or fundamentally reconstructed, including the humoural theory of 
medicine, the phlogiston theory of chemistry, and the caloric theory of heat.  One of the 
important messages of Laudan’s article is that it is crucial not to conflate success with truth.6  
It is worth noting, though that there are other intellectual resources which have been used 
to come to similar conclusions.  For example, John Holmwood has drawn on Parsons’ (1949) 
[1937] epistemological ideas to argue that in order to deal with ‘residual’ categories, those 
not integrated into the theoretical system, the system itself may need to be reconstructed 
(see Chapter 3 of Holmwood, 1996).  
A classic example of the fallibility of successful theories in the physical sciences is the 
reconstruction of the concepts of gravity, space and time necessitated by Einstein’s Theories 
of Special and General Relativity.  Although there are questions about exactly which 
scientific findings Einstein considered problematic enough for Newtonianism that he was 
motivated to develop an alternative (see Holton, 1969; Van Dongen, 2009), nevertheless a 
key aspect of the strength and appeal of Einstein’s work was due to its ability to deal with 
phenomena such as the advancing perihelion of Mercury (see Hanson, 1962) and the results 
of the Michelson-Morley experiment, both of which were anomalous to Newtonian theory, 
but could be coherently accounted for within Einstein’s approach (Hentschel, 1992).  In 
order for this development to occur, Newton’s hugely successful analysis of gravity had to 
be crucially reconstructed such that gravity was no longer conceived of as a force that 
produces instantaneous action at a distance from one body of mass to another but as a 
force emanating from an object with mass that bends space and time through the operation 
of waves (Will, 1988).  Likewise, apparently unproblematic conceptions of space and time as 
absolute were thrown into question such that, for example, the question of whether two 
events have occurred simultaneously was no longer seen as having a single, straightforward 
answer, this answer instead coming to vary depending on the framework which one was 
inhabiting (Hesse, 1974) 
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To give an example from social science, let me turn to debates about which forms of family 
organization are best for the children being raised in them.7  This is, admittedly, a politically 
contentious area which ties into wider social and political debates about the appropriate 
roles of men and women in society.  From the range of social scientific research in this field, 
I want to look at a particular segment of debate in which claims from one participant can be 
judged to be successful in terms of their consistency with some supporting data but have 
been shown by later research to be somewhat misleading.  This later research is itself part 
of an on-going investigative dynamic.   
The starting point for this example is the claim that fathers contribute something 
importantly distinctive to parenting such that the level of well-being of a child is typically 
improved by the involvement of their father.  The sociologist David Popenoe has been 
strongly committed to this viewpoint, and he claims that, when it comes to parenting, 
‘fathers – men – bring an array of unique and irreplaceable qualities that women do not 
ordinarily bring’ (Popenoe, 1996a: 19).  Popenoe discusses various aspects of this, and to 
make this discussion manageable I want to focus on two specific claims.  The first is that 
fathers are important because they contribute positively to behavioural outcomes by (i) 
promoting self-control; and (ii) providing a role model to teenage boys who, without a 
father figure, are ‘notoriously prone to trouble’ (Popenoe, 1996a: 19-20).  The second is that 
fathers’ involvement with children contributes positively to the latter’s academic/cognitive 
skills and achievements (Popenoe, 1996a: 21).   For Popenoe, data from a range of studies 
support these claims because they show that children in two-parent families where the 
biological father and mother are present typically have more positive outcomes in these 
areas than children who are brought up solely by their mother (Popenoe, 1996b: 145-8).   
Popenoe’s argument has some degree of success (as defined above) insofar as the idea that 
fathers have a distinctive and positive contribution is consistent with some of the studies 
that he cites.8  The studies of children that Popenoe discusses do, at least to some extent, 
point to positive features of the involvement of fathers in child-rearing when it comes to the 
behaviour and academic/cognitive skills of children.  However, as I have been emphasising, 
theories that are successful may still need to be importantly reconfigured and 
reconstructed.  And this reconstruction has occurred in the analysis of fatherhood where 
debates and further research in the area have yielded evidence and analyses which provide 
strong reasons to reconstruct Popenoe’s explanation of outcomes.  Other writers have 
argued that it is misleading to associate the kinds of differences in outcome that Popenoe 
has pointed to with a distinctive value added by the involvement of the father (Biblarz and 
Stacey, 2010; cf. Anderssen et al, 2002).  One key way that this has been questioned is by 
exploring whether there are differences in outcomes between children in families parented 
by the mother and father, and those in families parented by two mothers.  This seems a 
more convincing way to analyse the role of fathers because, as Biblarz and Stacey (2010) 
point out, it avoids conflating number of parents with the input of a father, unlike 
Popenoe’s analysis.  That is to say, Popenoe is often comparing outcomes of a two-parent 
arrangement where the children are raised by the mother and father with outcomes of a 
one-parent arrangement where the children are raised by the mother.  Biblarz and Stacey 
avoid this problem by comparing outcomes in two-parent families where the difference is 
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between a mother-father and a mother-mother pair.  They do so by conducting a meta-
analysis of a range of existing studies that have compared outcomes for children with 
lesbian and children with heterosexual parents.  One important part of their conclusion is 
that significant differences have rarely been found – for every study that identified a 
significant difference in outcome, there were at least four others that did not (Biblarz and 
Stacey, 2010: 8; see also Tasker, 2010).  In relation to academic/cognitive skills, those 
studies that did find a difference identified a higher level of interest, effort and/or success in 
school from children brought up by two mothers rather than in mother/father parenting 
arrangements (Biblarz and Stacey, 2010: 8).  In relation to behaviour, only one study found a 
difference, and this, admittedly, found that teachers identified children with lesbian parents 
as being more likely to have an issue in this area (see Vanfraussen et al, 2002).  However, 
even here, this was only in relation to one aspect of behaviour – attention.  In all other 
aspects of behaviour, including those most relevant to Popenoe’s claim – aggressiveness 
and delinquency – this study was consistent with others in finding no difference.   
In my view, the findings of this meta-analysis present serious anomalies for Popenoe’s 
argument that fathers bring ‘unique and irreplaceable qualities’ that tame the troublesome 
behaviour of children and promote academic achievement.  The meta-analysis suggests that 
there is very little difference between children parented by two mothers and by a mother 
and father in these areas.  In the face of these anomalies, I would argue that Popenoe’s 
argument needed to be reconstructed, despite its initial success in finding support from 
some studies.  Instead of claiming that being parented by a father as well as a mother makes 
a distinctive contribution to positive outcomes in relation to children’s academic/cognitive 
achievement and behaviour, it is more plausible to argue that having two parents makes a 
positive contribution in this respect.  Note that to argue this is absolutely not to blame 
single-mothers for the apparent (average) outcomes for their children, as many factors to 
do with gendered economic inequality, stigma and problematic gender relations more 
generally surely contribute to these (see Silverstein and Auerbach, 1999).   
Of course, it would be inconsistent of me to argue that the success of recent research 
establishes definitively that two-parent families are best for the wellbeing of children.  
Ongoing research examines the validity of existing findings, challenges the conceptualization 
of wellbeing used, and investigates how other configurations, such as those involving more 
than two parents, might affect the children, all of which will have implications for claims 
about the role of fathers. 
I see these examples, one from natural science and one from social science, as illustrating 
the importance of reconstructing successful theories in the face of anomalous evidence.  
Returning from these examples to the general analysis, it is pertinent to explore exactly why 
it is the case that even very successful understandings may need to be reconstructed in 
order to deal with anomalies.  A key aspect of this is that elements of a network of 
understandings are connected to one another.  That is to say, both the coherent categories 
and the anomalies are linked together insofar as they are all part of the set of 
understandings that are being used to analyse the world.  Developing on from this, the key 
point is that the presence of anomalies may be bound up with the coherent categories, as 
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Holmwood and Stewart have argued (Holmwood and Stewart, 1991).  This is because it may 
well be the character of the coherent categories – the way they divide up and analyse their 
subject matter – that both contributes to their ability to coherently account for some 
phenomena and produces the existence of anomalies (that which they cannot coherently 
account for).  Thus, the Newtonian conceptions of gravity, space and time allowed this 
theory to coherently account for many aspects of planetary behaviour as comprehended 
within the observations of its era.  However, it was the very fact that the Newtonian 
approach comprehended gravity, space and time in this way which also meant that it could 
not coherently account for phenomena such as aspects of the positioning of Mercury.  This 
is one example of the approach to fallibility advocated here: the idea that any aspect of a 
set of understandings, no matter how apparently coherent and successful, may need to be 
transformed in order to improve our knowledge.  
Within the social sciences, the possibility that even successful understandings may need to 
be reconstructed to improve understanding has not always been recognized by those 
interested in reflecting on trajectories of inquiry.  For example, James Rule (1997) argues 
that it is a problematic feature of sociology that it has not accumulated reliable insights over 
time, tending instead to change its viewpoint at regular intervals.  Rule’s position is that it is 
accumulation rather than reconstruction which social sciences should be engaging in.  From 
the perspective that I am developing here, a lack of accumulation of substantive insights 
isn’t problematic in itself, as there is an expectation that theories and factual claims will 
need to change at some point to take inquiry forward.  What is more important from the 
standpoint of progress is whether plausible justifications can be given for preferring later 
positions over earlier ones, and I would argue, without being able to put a case forward 
here, that these may be given even where substantial transformations have taken place.9   
Having outlined the approach to fallibilism that I wish to defend, I now want to compare it 
with that taken by critical realists.  I will provide some background on Critical Realism first, 
and then look in greater depth at the arguments of Sayer and Elder-Vass. 
 
3. Critical Realism: Background  
Over the past 40 or so years critical realism has developed into a wide-ranging philosophical 
approach that analyses many phenomena, from religiosity and ethics to the character of 
‘race’ and gender discrimination (e.g. Porpora, 2005; Carter and Virdee, 2008; New, 2005).  
Given the focus on inquiry in this article, I will be concerned with critical realism’s influential 
philosophical analyses of natural and social science, and my aim in this section is to briefly 
introduce three elements: the notion of ontology, the critical realist approach to inquiry, 
and its treatment of epistemological relativism.  I will discuss these with particular reference 
to the work of Roy Bhaskar, who is usually seen as the founder of critical realism (for a more 
extended overview of critical realism see Collier, 1994). 
A central feature of critical realism is its strong emphasis on ontology, that is, on 
philosophical reflection about the basic characteristics of entities that are investigated by 
the social and natural sciences.  Critical realists such as Bhaskar argue that ontological 
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reflection is crucial in order to provide a convincing philosophical analysis of these activities.  
Bhaskar also contends that it can make an ‘under-labouring’ contribution to activities of the 
sciences by removing conceptual confusions and obstacles on the path to successful 
investigation (Bhaskar, 1997).  Arguably, some critical realist approaches go beyond that in 
order to propose extensive ontological frameworks which are seen as providing the 
appropriate starting point for empirical research (e.g. Archer, 1995).  Whatever the purpose 
it is recommended for, one of the key ontological ideas for critical realists is that of 
‘structure’.  Rather than seeing the world as constituted by patterns of events, or as 
intrinsically formless, critical realists argue that the world is made up of structured entities 
with causal powers, the interplay of which produces the events that occur in the world 
(Bhaskar, 1997).  The two further aspects of critical realism that I want to introduce here are 
the idea that inquiry is oriented to grasping the real structural properties of what is 
investigated, and the contention that critical realists should adopt epistemological 
relativism.   
From a critical realist perspective, pure natural science is about the identification of the 
structures of the natural world and an investigation of their powers (mechanisms).  Bhaskar 
outlines the process of investigation (logic of scientific discovery) in A Realist Theory of 
Science, which was originally published in 1975, though I will refer to the second edition 
from 1997.  For Bhaskar, the logic of scientific discovery has three phases (see Ch 3 of 
Bhaskar, 1997).  The first phase starts from a regularity of events.  This may be discovered in 
nature, but is, for Bhaskar, more likely to be produced within an experimentally controlled 
situation.  The second phase involves ‘creative model-building’ in which theories about the 
structures and powers that might generate such a regularity are put forward (Bhaskar, 1997: 
145).  In the third phase theories are put to the test in order to establish which structure 
and mechanism actually does account for the regularity in question and is thus ‘not 
imaginary but real’ (Bhaskar, 1997: 146).  Bhaskar’s subsequent work on the philosophy of 
social science argued that there are relevant differences between social structures and 
natural structures, as well as contending that human agents play an important role in 
producing social life.  Nevertheless, the orientation to identifying the real properties of 
these distinctively social entities was retained in Bhaskar’s thought, as well as in that of 
other critical realists (see Bhaskar, 1986; Archer, 1995). 
Moving onto the epistemic dimension of critical realism, from the terminology that Bhaskar 
sometimes uses in A Realist Theory of Science it might be assumed that he straightforwardly 
believes that science does discover the real, and thus that he sees successful theories as 
true.  However, Bhaskar also introduced epistemological arguments that point in a different 
direction, and have been influential on other critical realists.  To see this, we first need to 
consider his distinction between the transitive and intransitive dimensions of science.  For 
Bhaskar, the transitive is the domain of historically located theories and practices which is 
very much a social product and, as its name suggests, changes over time.  By contrast, the 
intransitive is the domain of events and objects that are unaltered by changes in scientific 
understanding of them (Bhaskar, 1997: 21-4).  This distinction provides a useful basis for 
Bhaskar’s argument that realists should accept ‘epistemological relativism’, and reject the 
‘correspondence theory of truth’ (Bhaskar, 1997 : 249).  His reason for making these claims 
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is the familiar post-Kantian one that we cannot compare propositions – transitive elements 
of science - with states of affairs in the world – the intransitive objects of knowledge.  
Bhaskar states that, as such, ‘[t]here is no way in which we can look at the world and then at 
a sentence and ask whether they fit’ (Bhaskar, 1997: 249).  Although the intransitive 
elements of the world do not change as a result of conceptual developments, transitive 
theories are fallible and can change over time.  As Bhaskar has made clear elsewhere, he 
does not take this to mean that we cannot give good grounds for preferring one theory to 
another (1986: 72).  Thus, although Bhaskar subscribes to epistemological relativism he does 
not subscribe to ‘judgemental relativism’. 
From this characterisation we can see that there are arguably two different tendencies in 
critical realism as developed by Bhaskar, one which sees inquiry as burrowing towards the 
real, and another which eschews the idea of correspondence and emphasizes the fallibility 
and changeability of our theories (see for discussion Fay, 1990).  What I want to suggest 
now is that related tendencies can be found in other critical realist work, and I will be 
arguing that this results in some critical realist arguments being incompatible with the 
transformational fallibility that I have been presenting as crucial if inquiry is going to 
improve by means of problem-solving. 
 
4.  Practical Success and Preservation: The Work of Andrew Sayer 
Andrew Sayer’s Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach (1992) [1984] is a highly cited 
book, and it is not hard to see why.  It is clearly written, and is addressed to the social 
scientific inquirer as much as the philosopher, without this compromising its careful 
argumentation.  There are also elements of Sayer’s account that chime in with an 
orientation to inquiry as a transformative process.  Nevertheless, what I want argue in this 
section is that there are aspects of Sayer’s approach which unintentionally retain a 
conservative orientation to inquiry, and which thus limit his embrace of the more radical 
consequences of fallibilism. 
Sayer’s core arguments have close connections to the aspects of realism presented so far.  
Sayer argues that we must make a clear distinction between ‘factual knowledge’ and ‘facts 
as things or states of the world’ (Sayer, 1992: 47).  Putting this another way, Sayer argues 
that we must separate out ‘Thought Objects’ from ‘Real Objects’ (Sayer, 1992: 47).  This is in 
line with Bhaskar’s insistence on making a distinction between the transitive dimension of 
knowledge, which changes over time as theories change, and the intransitive dimension, 
which does not change when scientific theories do.  Another idea that is very much related 
to Bhaskar’s work is Sayer’s more general insistence that we need to see the world scientists 
investigate as ‘structured’ and ‘differentiated’.  Sayer argues that this ontological claim 
about the character of the world is preferable to the conventionalist view that the world has 
‘a structureless, entirely malleable character’ (Sayer, 1992: 70).   
There are aspects of Sayer’s approach where his orientation to inquiry is close to the 
approach to fallibility that I am defending.  For example, Sayer loosens the hold of ‘facts’ as 
something that cannot be misguided and fallible by arguing that it is wrong to make a clear 
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differentiation between facts and theories such that facts are seen as having an ‘undeniable 
reality’ and theories are seen as ‘speculative’ (Sayer, 1992: 48).  Rather, Sayer argues that 
we should speak of ‘factual statements’ rather than facts, and he contends that both factual 
statements and theories are ‘thought objects’ (Sayer, 1992: 52).  This means, for example, 
that the data that we gather through observation or other means are always 
preconceptualized.  Sayer develops this notion in critique of others who might fail to 
recognize this: 
‘Social scientists who treat “data” literally as “given things” (often those who feel 
most confident about the objectivity of their knowledge and the “hardness” of their 
facts) therefore unknowingly take on board and reproduce the interpretations 
implicit in the data: they think with these hidden concepts but not about them.’ 
(Sayer, 1992: 52.  Emphasis in original) 
In this quote Sayer nicely encapsulates a key fallibilist point: that inquirers need to be aware 
that their data are always interpreted by them.  As such, it is misleading to treat ‘facts’ – our 
factual claims – as having a distinctive hardness that makes them resistant to 
transformation. 
Sayer addresses fallibilism more directly when discussing the notion of absolute truth, 
stating that: 
‘Strictly speaking, then, we can never justifiably claim to have discovered the 
absolute truth about matters of fact, or to have established some absolute 
foundation for our knowledge (‘foundationalism’).  Our knowledge must be admitted 
to be fallible.’ (Sayer, 1992: 67.  Emphasis in original) 
Although he rejects the notion of absolute truth, Sayer does not reject the idea of assessing 
the justification of beliefs altogether, and like Bhaskar he criticizes ‘judgemental relativism’ 
(see Sayer, 2000a: 47-8).  Sayer argues that instead of focusing on absolute truth we should 
assess the ‘practical adequacy’ of beliefs.  Sayer states that: 
‘To be practically adequate, knowledge must generate expectations about the world 
and about the results of our actions which are actually realized.’ (Sayer, 1992: 69) 
According to Sayer, then, theories can be distinguished by their ability to cope with the 
world.  Sayer argues that this is a criterion implicitly accepted by ‘idealists’ in their everyday 
actions.  Though idealists might explicitly argue that the world is how we construct it, ‘they 
do not generally try to leave rooms through the ceiling rather than the door’ (Sayer, 1992: 
70).  That is to say, even idealists pay attention to the likelihood that their actions will or will 
not be successfully realized; and in doing so, they are deciding to act on practically adequate 
beliefs (that a door makes a good exit point) rather than impractical beliefs (that one can 
float through the ceiling).   
Having pointed out positive features of Sayer’s approach to fallibility, I now want to argue 
that there is nevertheless an implicit conservatism in the way that Sayer relates the practical 
adequacy of a theory to the state of the world to which the theory applies.  To see this, let’s 
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consider Sayer’s discussion of what he characterises as two competing ‘conventions’.  It is 
worth quoting Sayer at length: 
‘The reason that the “convention” 1 that we cannot walk on water is preferred to the 
convention 2 that we can, is because the expectations arising from 1, but not 2, are 
realized.  They are realized because of the nature of the associated material 
interventions (trying to walk on water) and of their material contexts.  In other 
words, although the nature of objects and processes (including human behaviour) 
does not uniquely determine the content of human knowledge, it does determine 
their cognitive and practical possibilities for us.  It is not thanks to our knowledge 
that walking on water doesn’t work, but rather that the nature of water makes 1 
more practically adequate than 2.  The fact that 1 is nevertheless still, in principle, 
fallible, needn’t alter our preference for it over 2.’ (Sayer, 1992: 70) 
What is problematic from the perspective of transformative fallibilism developed in this 
article is the way in which the ‘nature’ of the object being related to is invoked as an 
explanation for the success of a particular theoretical claim (convention).  The success of a 
theory is being explained with reference to the nature of the world, as in Sayer’s statement 
that ‘It is not thanks to our knowledge that walking on water doesn’t work, but rather that 
the nature of water makes 1 more practically adequate than 2’.10  The problem with this 
inference is that it rests on a static and present-practice-centred view of the possibilities.  
Despite having suggested that convention 1 is potentially fallible, Sayer still assumes that its 
present practical success indicates something about the nature of water rather than about 
our current state of knowledge.  But I would argue that this is to reify present practical 
success and use it to make a questionable inference about the nature of things.  
Let me develop this criticism further.  What I want to contend is that it would only be if the 
claim ‘we cannot walk on water’ is unshakeable that Sayer could infer something about the 
nature of water from it.  But to argue this is to reify our current state of knowledge and 
capabilities as if these could not change.  An initial way to question Sayer’s example would 
be to point out that we can indeed walk on water – when it is frozen to a certain level of 
thickness.  This might seem a flip response, but let us consider that if we lived at a low 
altitude in an equatorial climate zone without electrical technologies we might have 
confidently asserted that water could not be walked on, and been very surprised to discover 
that it could when it solidified into ice.  That would have been an unidentified possibility for 
us.  In response to this, Sayer could refine his convention to argue that we cannot walk on 
water in its fluid state, but what I want to suggest nevertheless is that it is possible that 
humans might find some way to walk on fluid water, one which drew on hitherto 
unidentified practical possibilities.  
Let me give a different example from scientific history to try to make this point seem less 
speculative.11  An Andrew Sayer from the 1850s might have said the following: “The reason 
that the “convention” 1 that we cannot generate vast amounts of energy from a few grams 
of matter is preferred to the convention 2 that we can, is because the expectations arising 
from 1, but not 2, are realized.  It is not thanks to our knowledge that generating vast 
amounts of energy from a few grams of material doesn’t work, but rather that the nature of 
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matter makes 1 more practically adequate than 2.”  1850s Sayer would have been quite 
right about the practical success of his beliefs at the time, but quite wrong to infer that this 
was due to the nature of matter.  Later work by Einstein and others meant that it is possible 
to extract vast amount of energy out of a few grams of matter.  Contrary to Sayer, what is 
practically possible is related to our state of knowledge.  To argue otherwise is to imply that 
our current practical capabilities do not simply represent our current levels of knowledge 
and practical skill but tell us something definitive about the nature of the world. 
The defender of Sayer might want to reply the following: as you admit, Sayer points out that 
the convention that we cannot walk on water is fallible – so how can he rightly be accused 
of reifying this claim?  My response to this would be in keeping with my general treatment 
of critical realism: the point is not that critical realists never make arguments which are 
consistent with the more radical form of fallibilism defended here.  Rather, it is that they 
also make arguments which reify certain claims about the world.  If Sayer’s views were 
completely consonant with transformational fallibilism he could not make the case that it is 
the nature of water that produces the practical adequacy of the relevant convention.  For 
Sayer to then add that convention 1 is fallible ‘in principle’ is either to use the idea of 
fallibility in a restricted fashion, treating it as a possibility that is nevertheless essentially 
inconsequential, or to immediately undermine his prior assertion.  That is to say, if Sayer did 
take the fallibility of convention 1 seriously he could not assert that it is the nature of water 
that makes it work rather than our state of knowledge, because making this connection 
between convention and nature undermines the idea that the convention may need to be 
transformed in the future. 
Let me sum up the discussion in this section.  I have argued that Sayer does at times 
acknowledge the fallibility of scientific knowledge in his work.  Given that this is the case, it 
is striking that he nevertheless wishes to infer something about the nature of the world on 
the basis of successful theories.  This displays a tendency to reify the understandings of 
current successful techno-scientific knowledge and project it out onto the external world 
with the implication that successful knowledge is underwritten by its adequate relation to 
the nature of objects.    From the perspective of this article, one key problematic outcome of 
this view is that, when taken seriously, it can undermine any sense that current scientific 
theories and practices are in need of transformation.12  The implication of Sayer’s critical 
realist view is that if there is some practical result that we cannot achieve this must be 
because of the nature of things, rather than the limitations of our current practice.13   
 
5.  Epistemological Standards and External Perspective: The Work of Elder-Vass 
The other critical realist approach that I want to consider is that of Elder-Vass.  Elder-Vass 
has quickly become an influential figure within critical realism, with his careful work on the 
notion of emergence and its relevance for understanding structure and agency stirring up 
debate between critical realists as well as challenging non-realist approaches (see for 
example Elder-Vass, 2007; King, 2007).  More relevant for our concerns here, though, is 
Elder-Vass’s recent book on The Reality of Social Construction (2012).  In this work, Elder-
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Vass offers a sympathetic critique of social constructionist ideas, arguing that aspects of a 
constructionist approach are compatible with critical realist analysis whilst also criticising 
other aspects of constructionist thought.   In order to understand the relationship of his 
theories to the question of fallibility we need some consideration of Elder-Vass’s analysis of 
knowledge, which is most clearly articulated in in Chapter 11 of The Reality of Social 
Construction.   
A key aspect of Elder-Vass’s orientation is his critical relation to the analytical tradition of 
epistemology which he sees as attempting to ‘justify some specific criterion of true 
knowledge from first principles’ (Elder-Vass, 2012: 209).  Elder-Vass argues instead that 
knowledge should be judged by ‘actual standards that exist independently of philosophers’ 
and these are what we should be concerned with (Elder-Vass, 2012: 209.  Emphasis in 
original).  The classic view of knowledge within analytic philosophy is that knowledge is 
‘justified true belief’,14 and, whilst Elder-Vass accepts that knowledge is about belief, he 
argues that we should not associate knowledge with truth for the following reason: 
‘We can never know with certainty that any given knowledge claim is true (though 
we may be very confident that it is) and hence to identify knowledge with true belief 
would mean that we could never know whether any given claim was knowledge or 
not.’ (Elder-Vass, 2012: 210) 
Underlining this point, Elder-Vass argues that it is ‘impossible for us to apply in practice’ the 
standard that knowledge is true belief, and thus rejects the requirement that to be 
knowledge a belief should be true (Elder-Vass, 2012: 210).  However, he does retain the idea 
that to be knowledge a belief should be considered to be justified.  And he gives this 
justification a social character insofar as he argues that beliefs can be considered justified, 
and thus as knowledge, when they are formed in line with ‘socially authorised practices’ of 
the appropriate kind (Elder-Vass, 2012: 214). 
In order to account for social authorisation, Elder-Vass applies his notion of ‘norm circles’.  
For Elder-Vass ‘a norm circle is the group of people who are committed to endorsing and 
enforcing a particular norm’ (Elder-Vass, 2012: 22).  In relation to the authorisation of 
knowledge, Elder-Vass argues that there are two relevant sorts of circles that contribute to a 
belief becoming knowledge.  One of these is ‘epistemological circles’, the members of which 
uphold a view about which criteria must be met for a belief to count as knowledge.  As an 
example, Elder-Vass suggests that members of the Azande act as an epistemological circle 
who enforce the idea that certain oracular practices are a means for obtaining knowledge 
about who is engaging in witchcraft within the social group (Elder-Vass, 2012: 218).  What 
epistemological circles do is thus endorse a certain way of producing knowledge as valid.  
Complementing these are ‘epistemic circles’ which Elder-Vass explores in relation to active, 
currently-debated scientific knowledge claims.  Whereas epistemological circles ratify a 
certain kind of procedure, epistemic circles authorize specific claims.  Elder-Vass suggests 
that in some scientific fields, there may be a great deal of agreement on which claims to 
endorse, whereas in others there may be different groups who endorse competing, 
incompatible claims (Elder-Vass, 2012: 227).  Alongside epistemological and epistemic 
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circles, Elder-Vass argues that there can be other kinds of social influences, such as views 
about gender, which have shaped scientific knowledge production (Elder-Vass, 2012: 228). 
Elder-Vass characterizes his approach as an ‘ontological’ one, but he is well aware that 
analyses of knowledge have epistemological consequences, and we can turn to explore 
these now.  In considering these issues Elder-Vass argues that we need to be cautious of 
broad terms like ‘relativism’, and he offers a differentiated set of categories to account for 
his position.  Elder-Vass argues that his approach supports ‘knowledge relativism’ insofar as 
it acknowledges that what is held to be knowledge may vary across time and place, and also 
that some beliefs that are held to be knowledge within particular epistemic circles will be 
false (Elder-Vass, 2012: 230).  As part of this position, Elder-Vass acknowledges that one 
claim may conflict with another but both may nevertheless count as knowledge, and indeed 
‘be knowledge’ if each is upheld within a different epistemological/epistemic circle (Elder-
Vass, 2012: 230-1).  Although he upholds knowledge relativism, Elder-Vass wants to reject 
another form of relativism, relating to truth.  Truth relativism involves the idea that 
incompatible descriptions of the world can all be true despite the fact that they conflict with 
one another.  Elder-Vass rejects such a position, arguing instead that: 
‘…all true ways of describing the world would be consistent with each other and 
correspond to a single reality that exists independently of our descriptions of it.’ 
(Elder-Vass, 2012: 231) 
Thus Elder-Vass insists that true theories will all be compatible with one another. 
As well as rejecting ‘truth relativism’, Elder-Vass rejects the relativist view that all standards 
are equally capable of warranting convincing knowledge claims.  This becomes clear when 
Elder-Vass states that ‘…not all epistemological standards are equal’ (Elder-Vass, 2012: 232. 
Emphasis in original).  What is the difference between them?  Elder-Vass states the 
following: 
‘Some epistemological standards are better than others in terms of the degree to 
which they tend to produce what Goldman calls veritistically reliable beliefs 
(1999)…That our epistemological standards are socially agreed and historically 
variable, then, does not entail that they are entirely arbitrary.  They may also be 
well-suited to the job of generating veritistically reliable, or approximately true, 
knowledge.’  (Elder-Vass, 2012: 232.  Emphasis in original)  
Furthermore, Elder-Vass argues that approximate truth plays an important role in assessing 
standards: 
‘…we can and should examine which epistemological standards are more conducive 
to generating reliable, approximately true knowledge, and we can often come to 
rationally justifiable conclusions in such evaluations.’  (Elder-Vass, 2012: 233) 
It is hard to see how this kind of evaluation can be undertaken without knowing which 
beliefs are approximately true.  The procedure strongly implied in Elder-Vass’s discussion is 
that we use standards to generate beliefs, see which of these are approximately true, and 
then use this as a means to praise or criticise the standards.15 
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Having outlined some of the key features of Elder-Vass’s approach, let me now turn to 
assess it.  Aspects of Elder-Vass’s position are consistent with the approach to fallibility 
defended here.  As we have seen, Elder-Vass rejects the association of knowledge with truth 
on the basis that to require a claim be established as true before it can be admitted to the 
sphere of knowledge is to place the bar impossibly high.  This is consistent with the 
transformational fallibilist view that identifying beliefs as ‘true’ illegitimately reifies those 
beliefs, treating them as ‘finalized’ rather than ‘in play’.  Nevertheless, I also want to argue 
that Elder-Vass’s adoption of ‘approximate truth’ as part of his account is a more 
problematic move.  
I should begin with an admission that the question of ‘approximate truth’ in Elder-Vass’s 
work is potentially difficult to analyse given that he does not, to my knowledge discuss the 
notion of ‘approximate truth’ further than in the quotations already cited.  This means that 
there are unanswered questions, such as why it is that Elder-Vass thinks that the generation 
of approximately true knowledge is a viable epistemic goal when he did not see the pursuit 
of truth in the same light.  Nevertheless, the issue I want to explore here is as follows.  
Elder-Vass’s analysis relies on the idea that the approximate truth of belief can be 
established.  What I want to argue is that the identification of beliefs as approximately true 
is problematic if we want, as inquirers, to keep all options on the table in terms of improving 
our knowledge. 
To explore this we need to go further than Elder-Vass and fill out the conception of 
approximate truth.  What I want to suggest here is that identifying a belief as approximately 
true seems to require a knowledge of the region or range in which the truth can be found.  
This is apparent, for example, in one of the serious analyses of the notion of approximate 
truth that can be found in the literature: that put forward by the scientific realist Stathis 
Psillos in his volume Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth (1999)16.  Psillos’ general 
view is well summarised in this remark: 
‘…a theory is approximately true if the entities of the general kind postulated to play 
a central causal role in the theory exist, and if the basic mechanisms and laws 
postulated by the theory approximate those holding in the world, under specific 
conditions of approximation.’ (Psillos, 1999: 277) 
This analysis treats judgements of the ‘approximate truth’ of a theory as something that is 
established by comparing the account given by the theory with the truth about the 
mechanisms and laws holding in the world.  To establish that a theory is approximately true, 
we have to know what is true.17  Now, it is important to acknowledge that Elder-Vass does 
not comment on Psillos’s notion of approximate truth and I am not suggesting that he is 
committed to Psillos’s approach.  Nevertheless, what is relevant about Psillos’s approach for 
our discussion is that it illustrates the point I mentioned above, which is that identifying 
approximate truth seems to require a knowledge of the region the truth itself is in.  Psillos’s 
account is perhaps unusual in the precision required in the reference to ‘specific conditions 
of approximation’.  But even more everyday uses of ‘approximate’ seem to rely on a sense 
that one knows the range in which the matter being approximated can be found.  Thus, if I 
measure the length of my desk by counting the number of times I can flip a ruler from one 
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end to the other, I could legitimately describe this as approximating the length of the desk, 
and I would have a sense of the likely parameters of the length even if I’m not confident I 
have pinned it down exactly.18  Thus, it seems plausible to link the notion of ‘approximate 
truth’ to the idea that we can identify the parameters which the truth itself is in. 
However, I would argue that the idea that we can know the parameters in which the truth 
resides is deeply questionable.  This relies on the idea that the framework of theories and 
concepts through which we interact with some subject matter are essentially correct, and 
the only changes that will be required in order to improve our understanding will be small-
scale improvements in precision.  What this seems to rule out is that more serious revision 
and reconceptualization may be required in order to deal with existing problems of 
understanding.   Putting this point in terms of usage, would it seem natural to say of a belief 
that it is ‘approximately true but in need of serious revision?’  I would argue that this would 
be a jarring utterance to make about a belief.  As such, if we want to defend the idea that all 
beliefs should be considered open for reconceptualization in order to improve our 
understanding we will not designate them as approximately true.  To be clear, once again, 
this has required some extrapolation beyond the explicit remarks made by Elder-Vass about 
approximate truth.  Nevertheless, my sense is that these extrapolations do not 
unreasonably overstate the truth-commitments implied in his use of this term, based on: (i) 
my reference to an explicit analysis of approximate truth in the scientific realist tradition; (ii) 
connections with the everyday sense of approximation; (iii) Elder-Vass’s own reference to 
Goldman, whose work shows a strong confidence in human ability to locate truth. 
I think it is worth commenting here on why the temptation might arise to define certain 
aspects of our understanding – say theories - as approximately true.  This seems likely to 
occur when these theories are very successful, and mesh well with factual claims that are 
widely accepted.  One has a sense that the critical realist thinks that there is a degree of 
sophistry in questioning the approximate truth of a theory in such cases (cf. Porpora, 2004).  
And, indeed, Elder-Vass’s arguments have an intriguing link to Sayer’s when the former 
refers to the possibility of generating ‘reliable, approximately true knowledge’.  In both 
cases we can see the temptation to move from the success/reliability of a theory to make 
some further claim about it: in Sayer’s analysis, that it has some connection with the nature 
of the object, in Elder-Vass’s analysis, that it is approximately true. 
What I would argue, by contrast, is that a theory can have undoubted and numerous 
successes, but it is important to avoid being mesmerised by these.  The threads that will 
unravel established theories are often to be found elsewhere.  Thus, instead of trying to 
explain why a theory is very successful by reference to its approximate truth, we should be 
continuing to explore the anomalies and problems which may ultimately lead to its 
reconstruction.  Simply focusing on the achievements or reliability of Newtonian 
gravitational theory, for example, would have discouraged attention from the puzzles and 
anomalies that were challenges to it, some of which ultimately contributed to the need for 
it to be importantly reconstructed. 
Am I overstating the case that a strand of critical realist analysis reifies successful theories 
alongside its otherwise useful commitment to fallibilism?  It might be argued, after all, that 
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the formulations I have picked up on would be better seen as occasional slips in the way 
ideas are expressed rather than genuine theoretical commitments.  I would contend that 
this is not the case.  My argument is that there is a side of critical realism which, in its 
orientation to burrowing towards the ‘real’, and in its view that practical success reveals the 
character of the real (at least to some extent), leads to a restricted commitment to 
fallibilism.  Let me give one last example of this, returning to the work of Bhaskar.  Early in 
the pages of A Realist Theory of Science, Bhaskar states the following: 
‘We can easily imagine a world similar to ours, containing the same intransitive 
objects of scientific knowledge, but without any science to produce knowledge of 
them…In such a world the causal laws that science has now, as a matter of fact, 
discovered would presumably still prevail, and the kinds of things that science has 
identified endure.  The tides would still turn and metals conduct electricity in the 
way that they do, without a Newton or a Drude to produce our knowledge of them.  
The Wiedemann-Franz law would continue to hold although there would be no-one 
to formulate, experimentally establish or deduce it.  Two atoms of hydrogen would 
continue to combine with one atom of oxygen and in favourable circumstances 
osmosis would continue to occur.’ (Bhaskar, 1997: 22) 
Although Bhaskar is making an argument about the persistence of objects and causes 
independent of science he does so in a way which relies on the reification of present 
scientific understandings and the identification of them with the real.  By referring to ‘the 
same intransitive objects’ existing in a world without science, and then proceeding to list 
what these are, Bhaskar is surely breaking down the barrier that he was attempting to build 
between the transitive and the intransitive.19  If the fallibility of the Wiedemann-Franz law 
was taken seriously, Bhaskar could not say that it would hold whether or not anyone was 
there to formulate it.  If, as I have suggested about knowledge in general, the law is 
considered to be ‘up for grabs’, and as potentially in need of reconstruction to improve our 
understanding, we cannot say that it will apply whether or not anyone grasps it.  This is to 
project the law onto reality itself.  Likewise with the statement that hydrogen and oxygen 
would continue to combine without our knowledge of them.  This, again, is to treat our 
understanding of atoms and their interactions as if it correctly characterizes the world.  Of 
course, one response to this would be to say: “Quite right, too!  Who could doubt the 
atomic constitution of water?!”  But two things can be said about such a response.  First, 
those who are inclined to argue that way are tacitly giving up on a serious commitment to 
fallibilism and throwing their weight behind the view that science produces certainty, at 
least in relation to some of its claims.  Second, one does not have to be a raving skeptic to 
believe that scientific classifications of atoms and of the constitution of water could change.  
For example, Hasok Chang (2012) gives an elegant defence of the ways in which the grip of 
current accounts of water and its atomic constitution could be loosened by conceptualizing 
the elements and their interactions in a somewhat different manner.  The argument I am 
making is not that current characterisations of water and its atomic constitution should be 
rejected at the present time.  Rather it is that, as with any other knowledge claim, they need 
to be considered to be potentially fallible so that they can be reconstructed if required in 
order to make problem-solving improvements in our understanding.  Summing up, I see this 
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quote from Bhaskar’s key realist work as providing a further example of the aspect of critical 
realist thought that conflates successful scientific theorizing and reality, resulting in 
problematic consequences for thinking about the reconstruction of theories.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
In this conclusion I would like to briefly address a philosophical question that may strike 
readers as arising from the discussion so far, and then try to pull together the threads of the 
arguments made in this article. 
The philosophical issue I would like to address is whether the transformational fallibilism 
that I am defending is best understood as a realist, pragmatist, or constructionist approach 
to inquiry.  I am not entirely comfortable with these categorisations but, if pushed, I would 
be inclined to characterise my position as a form of ‘minimal realism’.  My view is realist in 
the sense that I believe that inquiries can be oriented to investigating the properties of 
some subject matter rather than being directly concerned with improving the practical 
success of action (as is arguably the case in pragmatism) or in imposing one’s perspective on 
others (as in some forms of constructionism).  In my view, many claims made within 
investigations are attempts to ‘get to grips’ with a particular subject matter.  However, my 
realism is ‘minimal’ because I do not hold that even the most successful scientific (or other 
kinds of) investigations get in touch with the truth about the real properties, structures, and 
characteristics of what we engage with through our network of understandings.  Our best 
understandings are based in our own perspective and thoroughly defeasible and subject to 
reconstruction.  My view is that to claim that a belief is true is to misleadingly separate out 
that belief from its interconnections with other beliefs and to protect it from further 
reconsideration and reconstruction.  Given the apparent richness of the universe, the 
complex interconnectedness of our understandings, and the limitations of the perspective 
that we work from, the truth about our subject matter is not even asymptotically 
approachable or subject to successful approximation.  As such, my view that our best 
understandings are those that currently work best for us in terms of our interactions with 
the world puts me very close to the border of realism and pragmatism. 
The initial intention of this article was to defend the idea that there is still something 
valuable to be gained from reflecting on the concept of fallibility.  To pursue this I have 
developed a conception termed transformational fallibility.  The argument has been that the 
acknowledgement of possible fallibility should not just be considered a philosophical nicety 
with no substantial consequences for inquiry but, rather, that all elements of a network of 
understanding should be actively considered to be fallible and potentially subject to 
reconstruction so that the network can be improved by productively removing anomalies.  
Having provided a general analysis of this idea I then sought to show the distinctiveness of 
transformational fallibilism, and its advantages over other approaches, by contrasting it with 
the more limited acknowledgement of fallibility within the work of two important critical 
realists, Andrew Sayer and Dave Elder-Vass.  In Sayer’s work the limitation on fallibility 
appears with the argument that successful interactions with a specific subject matter tell us 
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something about the nature of that subject matter.  In Elder-Vass’s case, the limit arises out 
of his defence of the idea that we can identify the approximate truth of claims.  Of course, 
simply identifying a difference in treatment between critical realism and my own approach 
would not be sufficient to establish the benefits of the latter.  As such, I have also been 
arguing that these moves permit successful forms of inquiry to rest on their laurels, and to 
transmute their empirical/practical successes into something deeper and more permanent.  
What I am advocating instead is a strong commitment to impermanence.  To continue to 
improve our understanding, and avoid getting snagged on current successes, we need to see 
inquiry as an ongoing process where all elements can be subject to criticism, and, over time, 
all can be expected to change. 
 
 
Endnotes 
 
1 This is my (fallible) recollection of his remarks. 
 
2 The arguments in this article might have been presented in a different way, such that what 
I call ‘transformational fallibilism’ here was argued to be the genuine content of any 
commitment to fallibilism.  The argument would then be that others who claim to be 
fallibilists simply do not work through the implications of their commitment properly.  This 
would have been a possible way of presenting the argument but given that it is common for 
adherents to fallibilism to hold a cautious, limited view of its consequences, it seemed 
clearer to me to identify the approach I am defending as one sub-category of fallibilism. 
 
3 In making this argument I am not subscribing to a coherence theory of ‘truth’, rather 
looking at the relevance of coherence to processes of inquiry.   
 
4 A similar concern is addressed by Popperians in their considerations about what kinds of 
developments are legitimate ‘scientific’ moves to make when a theory is faced with an 
anomaly and is thus falsified (e.g. Popper, 1959; Lakatos, 1978).  One possible Popperian 
treatment of this is that the replacement theory should have greater ‘content’ than the 
theory which was falsified.  I cannot go into the complexities of the issue here but suffice to 
say there has been much debate about this idea including what are, to my mind, telling 
criticisms of such an approach (see for example Holmwood and Stewart, 1991; Bamford, 
1993).  I should also note that I am not attempting to set-up an idea of scientificity but 
rather looking to elucidate one way in which a set of understandings can plausibly be said to 
have undergone an improvement.  
 
5 It’s important to be clear that in arguing that any element of the understanding may 
require revision I do not mean that an inquirer should be prepared to change the totality of 
their understandings in one go, as it is hard to see how a rationale for such a change could 
be given.  One of the limitations of Kuhn’s analysis was his tendency to see competing 
approaches as self-enclosed and mutually exclusive totalities such that converting from one 
23 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
to the other involved something like a complete conversion from one set of theoretical and 
factual understandings to another (see Demir, 2006). 
 
6 It is worth noting that some philosophers have worked to ‘pick off’ cases identified Laudan 
by questioning whether they were really ‘successful’ (see for example Leplin, 1997; Psillos, 
1999).  I cannot properly address their arguments here, but I would comment that the 
criteria for success that these later philosophers use are often both highly restrictive 
(excluding very much apparently ‘scientific’ knowledge down the ages from meeting these 
criteria, let alone any ‘non-scientific’ knowledge) and also at a questionable distance from 
the criteria that seem to be have used by the knowledge-producers at the time. 
 
7 Thanks to Sharani Osborn for suggesting this example. 
 
8 Popenoe cites a wide range of studies, and it is possible to question whether all of them 
support his claims.  Nevertheless, in the areas I have identified, it seems to me that at least 
some of the studies he cites are consistent with his arguments. 
 
9 It might be wondered how the views defended here relate to Popper’s doubts about the 
idea of justification and his questioning of the giving of ‘positive evidence’ for knowledge 
(e.g. Popper, 1959).  I would say that the approach I am taking is broadly Popperian in that I 
agree that knowledge claims are not able to be justified in the sense Popper often focuses 
on.  That is to say, Popper rejects the idea that claims can be shown to be true or highly 
probable because of positive evidence in their favour, and I follow him on this.  A more 
complex issue is whether I might differ with Popper on the extent to which positive support 
of any kind can be given to a knowledge claim.  Quite what Popper’s views on this matter 
are have been discussed and disagreed upon in debates that address the related question of 
whether Popper is tacitly committed to induction in some form (for one important 
contribution see Lakatos, 1978).  All I can do here is give the reader a flavour of my own 
view: that ‘positive support’ for a claim is not an intrinsically problematic notion, and indeed 
is part of reasonable argumentation, but that no matter how much ‘positive support’ a claim 
has, this does not make it unquestionable. 
 
10 In case it be thought that this is an anomalous formulation by Sayer, we can also consider 
his statement that ‘the usefulness [of a theory] is not accidental but due to the nature of the 
objects of knowledge’ (Sayer, 1992: 70).  See also his criticism of instrumentalism which 
states that ‘…it is the structure of the world, rather than our theories about it that make 
practices possible or impossible.’ (Sayer, 1992: 71) 
 
11 It might be considered illegitimate to draw parallels from Sayer’s example, which deals 
with practical everyday knowledge, in order to extrapolate conclusions about his treatment 
of scientific claims.  However, I would argue that this is not the case.  I am not aware of 
Sayer marking any fundamental gap between practical everyday knowledge and scientific 
claims.  Furthermore, the views that I have cited are raised precisely in a critical discussion 
of alternative philosophies of science – conventionalism and instrumentalism.  My sense is 
that Sayer chose a somewhat ‘everyday’ example for the sake of simplicity rather than to 
distinguish between everyday practical action and scientific analysis in this regard. 
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12 I am not arguing that the implication of Sayer’s arguments about conventions and reality 
is that science is redundant.  Even if my interpretation of this strand of Sayer’s 
argumentation is correct, Sayer could still see science as relevant for investigating other 
kinds of phenomena where successful conventions have not yet been established, or for 
generating new levels of precision in relation to known phenomena.  My point is rather 
more specific: it is that the strand of Sayer’s approach which is less fallibilist in character 
implies that once success is established this tells us something about the world and thus 
encourages us to move science on to other areas or towards refining existing successful 
understandings rather than seeing these as up for a more fundamental reconceptualization 
and revision.   
 
13 See Holmwood (2001) for a related critique of Sayer’s ideas which argues that the latter’s 
defence of a distinction between system and lifeworld (Sayer, 2000b) reifies the categories 
of analysis in a problematic way.   
 
14 It’s worth acknowledging that there are variations on this within analytical epistemology, 
with some writers arguing for further conditions, and others wishing to dispense with the 
relevance of justification.  For an interesting discussion of some of these positions see 
Williams (2001). 
 
15 An analogy would be as follows: if we are going to test out recipes by working out which 
of them results in a moist cake, we would make the cakes, and then test them for their 
moistness.  In such a case, we have to be able to know which cakes are moist and which are 
not. 
 
16 I note here that Psillos’s analysis of approximation to truth is intended to avoid the 
difficulties found in that put forward by Popper (see Chapter 11 of Psillos, 1999).  It is 
perhaps also worth noting that it is questionable whether Popper’s own defence of the 
notion of verisimilitude is really consistent with his fallibilism.  But this is too large an issue 
to address here. 
 
17 It might seem puzzling that the approximate truth would be of interest if the truth was 
already available.  Psillos is interested in approximate truth because it provides him a means 
to say that although a general theory may not be strictly true, it can be very close to the 
truth (the established facts of the matter).  For example, Kepler’s first law is not strictly true 
because it does not capture planetary orbits absolutely accurately; nevertheless, for Psillos, 
it is approximately true because it is close to the truth about those orbits (Psillos, 1999). 
 
18 The enthusiast for the concept of truth might at this point say ‘Ha!  Doesn’t this example 
show that you accept an idea of approximate truth in relation to cases such as the truth of 
the length of the table?!’  My response would be that what I believe myself to be identifying 
about the table using my ruler is based within a (simplistic) framework of ideas about 
length.  My sense of what is approximate and exact is within this framework.  My 
understandings are unlikely to be compatible with the deepest considerations about length 
and measurement currently available in physics and philosophy, and nor do I see the current 
state of knowledge in those disciplines as the truth, the last word, on the question of length.  
Thus, I do not think I am capturing the truth of the length about the table by measuring it. 
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19 Holmwood and Stewart (1991: 18-19) make a similar argument in relation to Bhaskar’s 
analysis of theory change. 
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